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Abstract—Modern vehicles are becoming targets and need to
be secured throughout their lifetime. There exist several risk
assessment models which can be used to derive security levels
that describe to what extent components, functions and messages
(signals), need to be protected. These models provide methods
to gather application specific security requirements based on
identified threat and item combinations that need to be coped
with. However, a standardized mapping between security levels
and required mandatory security mechanisms and design rules
is currently missing. We address this problem first by suggesting
that the risk assessment process should result in five security
levels, similar to the functional safety standard ISO 26262.
Second, we identify suitable security mechanisms and design rules
for automotive system design and associate them with appropriate
security levels. Our proposed methodology is as much as possible
aligned with ISO 26262 and we believe that it should therefore
be realistic to deploy in existing organizations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer and network security became more and more
important as the number of interconnected devices spread. We
now face similar challenges in the ongoing transition towards
the Internet of things, industry 4.0 and smart connected vehi-
cles. Constraints, such as low computational power, low energy
consumption and real time reaction, are major challenges that
limit the range of applicable security mechanisms and design
rules. Back in 2011, Checkoway et al. provided a detailed
analysis of the attack surface of vehicles including attacks via
the Tire Pressure Monitoring System and the media player [1].
Furthermore, Miller and Valasek have demonstrated several
vulnerabilities that lead to attacks against vehicles that could
be performed remotely in 2015 [2].
There is currently no standard similar to the functional
safety standard ISO 26262 [3] for security in the automotive
domain. The ISO work item ISO/SAE AWI 21434 Road
Vehicles – Cybersecurity engineering is currently under de-
velopment and is planned to address threat modeling and risk
assessment. Proposed security models, such as Microsoft’s
STRIDE threat model [4], SAE J3061 [5] and the HEAVENS
model [6], describe how to identify items that need to be
secured, perform the threat analysis and result in security
levels for components and functions in a vehicle. HEAVENS
additionally describes a method for deriving item specific
requirements. Currently missing in proposed models is how
to select required security mechanisms for each component
and function based on the security level when following
the risk assessment process. In this paper, we address this
problem by first suggesting that the risk assessment process
should result in five security levels, similar to the Automotive
Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs) and, when needed, a set
of specific security requirements for that particular function.
Fig. 1 provides an overview and puts our work into context.
We believe the proposed methodology can show the way
towards a possible future automotive security standard similar
to ISO 26262 used in automotive safety. The proposed method-
ology is realistic to deploy in existing organizations, as it is
aligned with safety design methodologies which are already
in place. In addition, having distinct requirements for security
design allows the classification of components, including third-
party designs, and enables us to know how robust and secure
the design is and to what extend it can be trusted by other
components.
We emphasize that we are focusing on mechanisms to
be deployed in vehicles rather than traditional information
systems, which is covered by the ISO 27000 family [7]. The
contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a set of suitable mandatory security mech-
anisms and design rules for the automotive domain.
• We suggest a framework for mandatory security mecha-
nisms that should be required for specific security levels.
• We motivate the proposed method with an automotive
use case.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle
Systems, SAE J3061 [5], provides guidance for threat iden-
tification and assessment, and guidance for security in the
development process. HEAVENS [6] and EVITA [8] are two
Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) models also
referred to in SAE J3061, which result in security levels
and methods for how to specify security requirements for
identified threats. Later in this paper, we apply the HEAVENS
model to our automotive use case, to identify security relevant
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Fig. 1: Overview of the steps from performing Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) to requirement engineering.
items, i.e., functions, components and messages (signals), and
classify their security needs. The resulting security levels
constitute of six elements representing the security attributes
mitigating the STRIDE threats: integrity, authenticity, non-
repudiation, confidentiality, availability, and authorization.
IEC 62443 [9], a security standard for industrial communi-
cation networks, performs a similar mapping between system
requirements and security levels. IEC 62443 is not entirely
applicable for the automotive domain due to the focus on the
human operation of industrial automation systems.
The NIST FIPS PUB 199 [10], Standards for Security
Categorization of Federal Information and Information Sys-
tems, describes a security classification for information sys-
tems using confidentiality, integrity, and availability with each
having three levels, low, moderate and high. Additionally, the
NIST special publication SP 800-53 [11], Security and Privacy
Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations,
contains security mechanisms for information systems. The
work in the Connected Vehicles Pilot Development Phase 1 -
Security Management Operating Concept – New York City [12]
follows both, the NIST FIPS PUB 199 and NIST SP 800-
53, and identifies safety and privacy requirements for specific
usage scenarios and further divides these requirements in
information flow and device classes. As many of the NIST SP
800-53 security controls are not appropriate for the automotive
domain, the identified security requirements in this project do
not cover the requirements for the automotive domain in depth.
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) has started a task force on cybersecurity and over-
the-air issues in [13]. The version from 27/11/2017 consists
of a reference architecture, a list of security principles and
security controls to mitigate certain threats. We have taken
security mechanisms and requirements from all these works
into account when selecting relevant mechanisms applicable
for the automotive domain.
III. SECURITY MECHANISMS AND DESIGN RULES
Security mechanisms are used to mitigate threats and to
minimize the risk of security attributes of an item being
violated. Table I shows the mapping between the STRIDE
threats and the corresponding security attributes, including
an explanation from HEAVENS [6, p.6]. In Table I we
additionally associate the STRIDE threats with item types to
emphasize the threats violating the security attributes related to
these types. For example, mechanisms that mitigate all types
of threats are necessary in order to properly protect messages
or signals – the information flow.
The benefits of having a direct relation between STRIDE
and security attributes is that any threat assessment model
can be used to derive required mandatory security require-
ments provided a mapping to STRIDE exists. For example,
a mapping of the CIA model in [10] to STRIDE is also
possible, however, the desired granularity decreases due to
the aggregation of security attributes. A proposed mapping
between security levels and identified mechanisms is provided
in Table II. For some identified design rules and mechanisms,
it is favorable to divide them into different classes repre-
sented as numbers instead of dots in the table describing the
requirements in more detail. For instance, the requirement
AU.3 Verify authenticity of firmware/functions on start has
class 1 on demand verification of modules and a stricter class 2
secure boot. Furthermore, we highlight that these security
mechanisms are mandatory, nevertheless, a mechanism may
be disregarded when properly argued.
The following sections describe the six security attributes
and list the corresponding security mechanisms and design
rules. The security levels the mechanisms are associated with
range from 0 to 4, where level 0 demands no security and
level 1 and upwards require increased security needs.
TABLE I: Mapping of STRIDE threats to security attributes and types of items that need to be protected: information flow,
message (msg), firmware (fw), and hardware (hw)
STRIDE Threat (from
[4])
Security Attribute*
(from [5], [6])
Explanation (from [6]) Item Type
Spoofing Authenticity Attackers pretend to be someone or something
else
MSG, FW, HW
Tampering Integrity Attackers change data in transit or in a data store MSG, FW, HW
Repudiation Non-repudiation Attackers perform actions that cannot be traced
back to them
MSG, FW, HW
Information disclosure Confidentiality
Attackers get access to data (e. g., in transit or
in a data store) MSG, FW
Denial of Service Availability Attackers interrupt a system’s legitimate opera-tion
MSG, FW
Elevation of privilege Authorization
Attackers perform actions they are not autho-
rized to perform MSG, FW, HW
* Unlike SAE J3061 [5], we include the attribute freshness in non-repudiation and omit privacy, as we believe that privacy needs to be addressed separately.
A. Integrity
Integrity is a property that ensures that data, like messages
and firmware, have not been altered due to random errors
during transmission or by a malicious node. Message Authen-
tication Codes (MACs) can be used to verify the integrity
of data. We propose the use of MACs with securely stored
pre-shared keys as the required minimum to provide message
integrity. Verifying the integrity of software during boot or
when upgrading also requires the use of cryptographic hashes
along with secret keys. In order to decrease the time overhead
the verification of the firmware takes, the firmware may be
partitioned into modules and the verification of the integrity
may only be performed for modules currently needed.
IN.1 Message Authentication Code (MAC) with pre-shared
key.
IN.2 Cryptographic hash function with pre-shared key to
verify firmware integrity when upgrading.
IN.3 Cryptographic hash function with pre-shared key to
verify firmware/function integrity on boot.
IN.4 Physical protection against tampering.
IN.5 Detection of physical tampering.
B. Authenticity
Authenticity guarantees the origin of data, thus mitigates the
possibility to spoof data, i.e., messages and firmware. MACs
combined with authentication of nodes and session keys can
be used to provide authenticity and integrity of messages.
Authenticity of firmware received via over-the-air updates or
through a diagnostics device may be achieved with digital
signatures and physically unclonable functions may be used
to ensure the authenticity of hardware the Electronic Control
Unit (ECU) communicates with.
AU.1 Message Authentication Codes (MACs) with session
keys to provide message integrity and authenticity.
AU.2 Verify authenticity of firmware when upgrading using
digital signatures.
AU.3 Verify authenticity of firmware/functions on boot using
digital signatures.
AU.4 Verify authenticity of hardware, e. g., ECUs and diag-
nostics devices.
C. Non-repudiation
In order to cope with repudiation of messages, it is nec-
essary to include counters or timestamps in messages to be
authenticated to guarantee freshness. Moreover, it is needed
to store logs as evidence of performed transactions and the
use of digital signatures to provide proof about the source of
the message.
NR.1 Freshness mechanism, e. g., adding a counter or time-
stamp to message to be authenticated.
NR.2 Audit logging.
NR.3 Use of digital signatures for messages (signals).
D. Confidentiality
Encryption provides confidentiality of data. Some micro-
controllers can include embedded Hardware Security Modules
(HSMs) to provide hardware accelerated encryption and a
secure storage of cryptographic keys. Hardware acceleration
can be crucial when transmitting and receiving time-critical
authenticated and/or encrypted messages. In case decryption
is only required for firmware updates, it might be sufficient to
rely on software-based methods. Some ECUs might also not
have the resources to decrypt the firmware and to perform
the update. In such cases it has to be decided whether it
is sufficient that the gateway ECU decrypts and verifies the
firmware update.
CO.1 Encryption of messages when transmitted over the net-
work.
CO.2 Encryption of firmware when transmitted over the net-
work.
E. Availability
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks can target the network and
computational resources of an ECU. The effectiveness of DoS
attacks aiming at the network strongly depend on the network
architecture. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, for
instance, is due to its nature highly vulnerable to DoS attacks
(see [1]), whereas Flexray (ISO 17458-1:2013) is based on
time-triggered control for accessing the physical medium. As
example, this time-triggered control approach already limits
the extent of the attack to the time slots the compromised node
is allowed to send. Other targets of DoS attacks can be memory
and I/O resources. Watchdog timers can protect against some
DoS attacks targeting the computational resources.
AV.1 Limiting access to network resources - Quality of Ser-
vice (QoS).
AV.2 Use of watchdog timers.
F. Authorization and Access Control
Authorization to perform certain tasks or to send specific
messages can be enforced individually or by introducing
roles on many levels, e. g., network, host, and function-level.
Restricting communication between ECUs can be controlled
by separating the ECUs into different domains and connecting
these domains via gateways that use whitelists. A more radical
approach is complete isolation of a specific network segment,
which may be feasible in only a few cases. Host-based access
control on the other hand can be used to restrict the types
of messages and their frequency an ECU is allowed to send.
Examples of logical separation are encryption of network
traffic, use of Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) and
virtualization techniques using hypervisors or containers. Do-
main isolation on the other hand, requires separated physical
networks, total isolation from other functions and processes,
dedicated memory, and guaranteed computational resources.
AC.1 Whitelisting of messages (signals) on gateways.
AC.2 Whitelisting of messages (signals) on ECUs.
AC.3 Access control on function level.
AC.4 Detection and logging of intrusions.
AC.5 Logical separation.
AC.6 Domain isolation.
G. Other Requirements
Some security design rules or guidelines have to be fulfilled
regardless of the security level due to compliance with laws
and regulations or strongly depend on the application rather
than a specific security level. Compliance to safe and secure
coding guidelines, such as MISRA C Guidelines [14] or SEI
CERT C Coding Standard [15], are the base for safe, secure
and reliable software. More design rules are for instance least
privilege and fail-safe defaults, which have been already listed
by Saltzer and Schroeder back in 1975 in [16]. Logging
of errors is essential when deploying Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs), additionally, all violations risen by security
mechanisms should be logged. We strongly recommend to take
the requirements below into consideration when designing the
system.
OR.1 Fail in known state (safe defaults).
OR.2 Input Validation.
OR.3 Operate with least set of privileges that are necessary.
OR.4 Compliance to secure coding guidelines.
OR.5 Secure logging of errors, data modification and updates.
IV. USE CASE AND ATTACK MODEL
The reference architecture for the automotive system we
will use in our discussion is shown in Fig. 2 and was
developed in the HoliSec project [17]. It illustrates a highly
simplified version of ECUs and their functionality where the
Vehicle ECU is responsible for the park brake status, warning
light and gear requests. The OBD-II port is provided by
the Edge Node GW which further interconnects networks to
the Infotainment unit, CAN bus ECUs, Ethernet nodes, and
the Driver Control unit. The Driver Control unit additionally
interconnects sensors, such as radar and cameras, the Vehicle
ECU, and the Driver Display.
Fig. 2: HoliSec reference architecture of an in-vehicle network.
A. Use Case
Fig. 3a illustrates the functions involved when implementing
Cruise Control (CC) functionality and what messages (signals)
these functions exchange. Function Cruise Control is located
in the Vehicle ECU. It receives target speeds from the driver
and sends a VehicleSpeedCommand to the function Speed
Control which is responsible for maintaining the target speed
and therefore also listens to VehicleSpeed broadcasts from the
Vehicle Speed function. In order to maintain the target speed,
Speed Control always broadcasts a BrakeCommand on the
CAN bus. Function Braking listens to BrakeCommand and Ve-
hicleSpeed to determine the best braking strategy to be applied
to the engine and, if needed, also engages the foundational
brakes. Function Braking broadcasts BrakeEngagedPercentage
to inform other functions, such as Light Control, about its
actions.
Furthermore, Fig. 3a shows the security levels obtained
from a HEAVENS TARA analysis, additionally, we added the
security demands on the messages to the source component
that is broadcasting information. The results from applying
TABLE II: Mapping between security mechanisms and security levels.
SL 0 SL 1 SL 2 SL 3 SL 4
Integrity
IN.1 [MSG] Message Authentication Code (MAC) with pre-shared key • • •
IN.2 [FW] Verify cryptographic hash of firmware when upgrading • • • •
IN.3 [FW] Verify cryptographic hash of firmware/functions on boot • •
IN.4 [HW] Physical protection against tampering • •
IN.5 [HW] Detection of physical tampering • • • •
Authenticity
AU.1 [MSG] Message Authentication Code (MAC) with session key • •
AU.2 [FW] Verify authenticity of firmware when upgrading using digital signaturesa 1 1 2 2
AU.3 [FW] Verify authenticity of firmware/functions on boot using digital signaturesa 1 2
AU.4 [HW] Verify hardware authenticity •
Non-repudiation
NR.1 [MSG] Freshness using counter or timestamp in authenticated message • •
NR.2 [MSG] Audit logging • •
NR.3 [MSG] Use of digital signatures for messages (signals) •
Confidentiality
CO.1 [MSG] Encryption of messages • •
CO.2 [FW] Encryption of firmware during transmissiona 1 2
Availability
AV.1 [MSG] Limited network access – Quality of Service • •
AV.2 [FW] Watchdog timer • • •
AC.1 [MSG] Whitelisting of messages (signals) on gateways • • • •
AC.2 [MSG] Whitelisting of messages (signals) on nodes • •
Authorization and AC.3 [MSG] Access control on function level • •
Access Control AC.4 [MSG] Deployment of Intrusion Detection Systems • •
AC.5 [MSG, FW, HW] Logical separationa 1 1 2
AC.6 [MSG, FW, HW] Domain isolation • •
Other requirementsb
OR.1 Fail in known state
OR.2 Information Input Validation
OR.3 Operate with least set of privileges that are necessary
OR.4 Compliance to secure coding guidelines
OR.5 Secure Logging
a The numbers imply the class of a mechanism – higher numbers imply higher demands.
b These requirements have not been mapped to security levels as they are either required by laws and regulations, should be considered when developing
secure systems or strongly depend on the application.
threat assessment techniques may vary for this example, how-
ever, the use case is used for illustration purposes to discuss
possible security mechanisms in an environment consisting of
different functions with different security levels communicat-
ing with each other. The security levels shown correspond to
the abbreviations of the security attributes from Section III:
SL = [AU, IN,NR,CO,AV,AC].
B. Possible Attacks
There are many ways to attack this system, for example
injection of faulty/wrong messages and modifications on the
functions themselves. We will focus on the two target functions
Speed Control and Braking to motivate the results of the
TARA analysis and the resulting security levels shown in
Fig. 3a. A modification or injection of faulty/wrong Vehi-
cleSpeedCommands or VehicleSpeed messages can cause the
Speed Control to think that the vehicle is driving at low
speed which results in a high acceleration. Modifications of
the Speed Control function in the ECU can lead to dangerous
situations if the BrakeCommand or the maximum acceleration
are being altered. An attack on the Braking function is also
dangerous if messages the function listens to are modified
which entails a wrong brake behavior and may cause an
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Fig. 3: Function view of the Cruise Control (CC) use case.
accident. Moreover, modifications of the function itself can
have severe outcomes.
C. Required Mechanisms
Once each function has a security classification, it is pos-
sible to find the mandatory security mechanisms according to
Table II. The required mandatory security mechanisms for this
use case are illustrated in Fig. 3b, which shows the required
mechanisms as boxes in each function.
It can be seen that functions with security levels up to
level 2 only need to fulfill basic security requirements, such
as verifying the firmware integrity when upgrading, whereas
the functions Speed Control and Braking have higher security
demands.
D. Applying the Framework
Mechanisms need to be deployed on the ECU and on the
network or bus. Mechanism AC.1 Whitelisting on gateways
needs to be deployed on the Edge Node GW and the Driver
Control since they act as gateway between the Vehicle ECU
and the Engine ECU. Also note that, if the source function
requires AU.1 MAC with session key, the receiving nodes need
to fulfill AU.1 for these messages. AV.1 Limited network access
requires a change in the underlying network technology, as
CAN itself does not provide means to limit the network traffic
per sender. In this case one may argue that alternative security
measures on the gateway, such as firewall-like functionality
to handle DoS attacks or physical separation, in combination
with IN.4, IN.5, AU.2 and AU.3 are sufficient for this specific
case. Another example is mechanism AC.5 Logical separation,
it may be sufficient to use VLANs for class 1, class 2 on
the other hand requires other virtualization techniques that are
affecting all other functions realized on the same ECU.
Combining items inside one ECU or even within one subnet
requires the aggregation of security levels by choosing the
highest occurring security level for each element in the vectors.
Nevertheless, it is up to the system designer to choose the level
of aggregation that provides the best trade-off between detail
and performance/hardware requirements.
V. DISCUSSION
This is a first attempt towards a mapping between security
levels and required security mechanisms for the automotive
domain. We strongly believe that having a standardized and
mandatory way to select required security mechanisms based
on the security level of the component is the next step in
vehicular security. There exist many models for how to assess
threats which result in a security classification of components,
and we continue at this point and identify suitable security
mechanisms for each security level.
Strict rules are necessary since many parties are involved in
the design and development process. Vehicle manufacturers
develop some parts of the vehicular system in-house, but
many components are provided by suppliers. We believe that
such a strict rule-set is necessary in order to not leave the
responsibility for developing secure systems to the individual
developers or to third-party developers. With this framework
in place, all involved parties know the minimum security
measures that need to be implemented and all designers
are already provided with basic protection against a large
number of threats. Additionally, designers may also add extra
application specific requirements that are not covered by the
required mechanisms. The decision of not implementing a
certain mechanism may arise, due to other restrictions, such
as cost and energy consumption. In such a case the choice of
using alternative methods needs to be properly justified.
Moreover, this framework enables system designers to easily
obtain an overview of the required mechanisms for each
item in a bigger system context, making it possible to see
dependencies between items, safety-critical or not, at an early
stage.
We are aware that our proposed security mechanisms need
to be defined in more detail, e. g., requirements on the Hard-
ware Security Module, key derivation methods, encryption
algorithms, and key lengths, and that the assigned security
levels may need to be adapted, however, we are convinced
that a framework similar to what we propose needs to be in
place for automotive security. In addition, we show with the
Cruise Control (CC) use case how this framework should be
applied and we have validated the usefulness and correctness
of the identified mechanisms and their corresponding security
levels with a large vehicle manufacturer.
VI. CONCLUSION
Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) is commonly
used to derive security levels which indicate the security
demands for components. Current models, such as HEAV-
ENS [6], describe methods to obtain security requirements,
however, they do not provide a direct mapping from security
levels to security mechanisms and design rules which reduce
the feasibility and impact of an attack. In this paper, we
have identified appropriate security mechanisms applicable
for the automotive domain and consequently associated these
mechanisms with security levels that describe the demand for
security. Having such a framework in place increases the effi-
ciency and transparency when deriving security requirements
for an automotive system, as current approaches place the
task of deciding which security mechanisms to implement on
the individual designers. We have additionally motivated the
proposed mapping with an automotive use case which has been
verified with a large vehicle manufacturer.
We have listed the identified mandatory security mecha-
nisms required for specific security levels in Table II. Some
components may require stricter rules in order to fulfill the
demand on security but having a framework like we propose
in place covers already basic security requirements that must
be implemented.
The interaction between vehicle manufacturers and third-
party developers of modules and ECUs benefits from such a
framework as well, since all involved parties will have the
same expectations of what has to be implemented for each
component.
We believe that this framework is a first step towards a stan-
dardized mapping to security mechanisms. Such a framework
is necessary, as it makes security design easier for system
designers, developers, suppliers and all other involved parties.
In addition, it prevents individual developers from making
poor security design choices since the components have to
provide the required security mechanisms.
In future work, this framework needs to be validated with
more use cases and security mechanisms have to be specified
in more detail. However, a task such as defining the specific
algorithms to be used has to be performed by standardization
organization in form of regularly updated recommendations.
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